pSAV: A Practical and Decentralized Inter-AS Source Address Validation Service Framework


Jiamin Cao, Ying Liu, Mingxing Liu, Lin He, Yihao Jia, Fei Yang






Source IP Spoofing

- Large attacks use source IP spoofing
 - Attackers hide their identities
 - Attack traffic is amplified with reflection
- Why source IP addresses can be spoofed?
 - Routing is based on destination IP addresses, without validating source addresses




Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA)

• Source address validation (SAV) in three levels



Defend against IP spoofing attacks from outside.

Benefit the entire Internet, except for the deployers themselves.



Allocate deployment incentives

Lack of deployment incentives

SAV as a service for a win-win situation

Lack of deployment incentives: the efforts and benefits do not match

 In a security alliance, ASes at the alliance boundary naturally have to bear more of the burden of inspecting packets and have less incentive to deploy SAV.

 Allocate deployment incentives

 Lack of deployment incentives

 SAV as a service for a win-win situation

 Provide trust foundation

 Lack of trust foundation

 Decentralized management, verification, consensus, ...


Lack of trust foundation

- Allow spoofed traffic
- Discard legitimate traffic

New DDoS Attack

Allocate deployment incentives SAV as a service for a win-win Lack of deployment incentives situation Provide trust foundation **Decentralized management**, Lack of trust foundation verification, consensus, ... *Consider deployment requirements* SAV mechanism based on **Different requirements** programmable devices **Different deployers have different** requirements: Labeling-based SAV **Routing-based SAV**


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Talk Outline

- Motivation
- pSAV Architecture
 - Control Plane
 - Data Plane
- Some Evaluation Results
- Conclusion

pSAV Architecture



Control plane: blockchainbased service subscription and auditing platform

Data plane: SAV implementation on programmable switches

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- AS Registration
 - Verify authenticity
- Service Subscription
 - Balance auditability and privacy
- Service Audit
 - Provide incentives

All	ASes must be registered before they join the blockchain.
•	Service subscriber: packets' characteristics, e.g., IP address
•	Service provider: SAV services they support
•	Service auditor: the auditing results

- AS Registration
 - Verify authenticity
- Service Subscription
 - Balance auditability and privacy
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Service transactions on blockchain

- Plain text
 - Subscriber, provider, SAV type, ..., to allow auditing of the service.
- Encrypted text
 - Privacy information about specific filtering rules, to prevent attackers from using this information to steer by the SAV service.

- AS Registration
 - Verify authenticity
- Service Subscription
 - Balance auditability and privacy
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Subscribers can know whether spoofed packets from auditors are filtered. (*See more in our paper!*)


Once audit results are confirmed by subscribers, *incentives are automatically*


redistributed to auditors from providers.

Data plane: SAV implementation on programmable switches

- Help service providers to accommodate various SAV technologies flexibly.
 - Routing-based SAV
 - Labeling-based SAV
 - Challenge: support various label generation algorithm (e.g., DES, AES) on programmable switches
 - Solution: optimization with exact match
 - Some more in our paper!

See more in our paper!






[RMT@SIGCOMM'13]

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
Evaluation Setup

- Data Plane: a network composed of four ASes with two Intel Tofino switches and three servers
 - Subscriber AS1
 - Provider AS2 (Intel Tofino switch)
 - Auditor AS3
 - Attacker AS4
- Control Plane: a test blockchain built with HyperLedger Fabric with one server
 - SAV contracts with 650 lines of GO language




Blockchain performance on control plane

- Transaction throughput and latency on the control plane.
 - Write-related transactions: registration, service request from the subscriber, response from the provider, audit result submission from the auditor, and confirmation from the subscriber.



(a) Transaction throughput.


Support > 1000 transactions per second.



Latency < 1s when there are < 900 transactions per second.

SAV Performance on Data Plane

• Throughput: labeling-based SAV with various label generation methods on the Tofino switch.



(a) Gbps under all packet sizes.

(b) Mpps under different packet sizes.

- All have > 100 Gbps throughput in line rate
- Larger throughput means larger service capacity and more revenues

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
Conclusion

- pSAV is a practical and decentralized inter-AS source address validation (SAV) service framework to promote inter-AS SAV deployment.
 - Take SAV as a payable service by dividing participant ASes into service subscribers, providers, and auditors.
 - On the control plane, leverage blockchain as the trust foundation to
 - enable service providers accountable for their offered services
 - allocate incentives to auditors for detecting unqualified services.
 - On the data plane, propose a flexible, high-performance, and low-cost SAV implementation mechanism for providers.

Thanks!




Service subscription and response are all blockchain transaction



- AS Registration
 - Verify Authenticity
- Service Subscription
 - Balance Auditability and Privacy
- Service Audit
 - Provide Incentives

Subscriber confirm -> incentives are automatically redistributed to auditor from provider.



Flooding-type

- Subscriber B: packets sent to B should carry some label
- Auditor C: send spoofed packets to B with IP addresses of A

Reflection-type

- Subscriber B: packets from B should carry some label
- Auditor C: send spoofed packets to other Ases (e.g., A) with IP addresses of B

SAV Overhead on Data Plane

- Memory and Stage Overhead of various blocks in Cryptographic computation
 - Permutation and mixcolumn: with the match unit width increasing, they require more SRAM and fewer stages.
 - Substitution: the stage number is always one.

